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I. INTRODUCTION 
Across the globe, those who study bankruptcy 
recognize that there are several fundamental failures of the 
system. Each country utilizes a different and specialized 
bankruptcy code, none of which have yet been perfected. 
More specifically, the different codes for corporate 
reorganization generally lead to conflicts between the 
shareholders and the creditors of insolvent companies. 
Disagreements between creditors and shareholders can lead 
to a bevy of problems with plan proposals and acceptance of 
cram-down. These conflicts are not easily repaired, but each 
code attempts to lessen these struggles as best as possible.  
The most notorious attempt at resolving this problem 
is the United States’ use of the absolute priority rule. 
Although the absolute priority rule does result in certain 
complications, the United States has successfully used it to 
make the corporate restructuring process run more smoothly. 
On the other hand, other large economic powerhouses, like 
Brazil, have not adopted statutes similar to the absolute 
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priority rule. Over time, a comparative approach has revealed 
that the use of the absolute priority rule leads to a shorter plan 
proposal period1, but is that really beneficial for the debtor 
company in the long term?  
It seems that many differences in the way corporate 
reorganizations are treated in the United States and in Brazil 
hinges on the use, or lack of use, of the absolute priority rule. 
The absolute priority rule, embedded in the United States 
Chapter 11 code, was meant to be a standard of fairness.2 
Without fulfilling the fair and equitable requirement, a plan 
cannot be crammed down.3 Although the United States 
implemented this rule as a requirement of treating each class 
of creditors fairly, it leaves many questions of fairness 
unanswered. This rule is said to be the proper method of 
delineating rights for shareholders and creditors, but it does 
not take into account all situations that landed a corporation 
into bankruptcy.4  
Brazil’s lack of an absolute priority rule does not mean 
that the reorganization process is inherently unfair. Brazil 
allows the corporation, along with its creditors and 
shareholders, to decide what is fair for the parties involved 
based on the different circumstances of each individual case. 
Without a rule requiring each senior class to be paid in full 
before a junior class can receive benefits allows more room for 
negotiation. With more negotiation comes a longer period of 
                                                 
 
 
1 Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in 
Corporate Reorganizations, 41 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 651–684 
(1974), 653. 
2 Id. at 651 
3 Stephen J. Lubben, The Overstated Absolute Priority Rule, 21 FORDHAM 
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 581-606 (2016), 595. 
4 See Blum, supra note 1, at 652. 
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time that the creditors and shareholders can squabble over 
what each party is entitled to. This difference in fundamental 
rules is one of the main reasons why corporate 
reorganizations take much more time in Brazil than in the 
United States.  
II. BACKGROUND ON BRAZIL 
Brazil is the largest country in South America and in the 
Southern Hemisphere, sharing a common border with every 
single South American country with the exception of Chile 
and Ecuador.5 In addition to its geographic vastness, Brazil is 
also the eighth largest economy in the world, even after 
experiencing the worst recession in the country’s history.6 The 
world views Brazil as South America’s principal economic 
powerhouse. Investors spend a great deal of money buying 
shares of and lending to large up-and-coming Brazilian 
corporations. Until recently, American investors considered 
Brazilian companies to be lucrative investments.  
After experiencing the worst recession in the country’s 
history in 2015 and 2016 the market value for publicly traded 
shares in Brazil dropped precipitously. The average value 
went from $1.02 trillion in 2013 before the recession to $490.5 
billion in 2016 after the recession.7 Brazil’s latest political 
scandal and the impeachment of the country’s president8 
                                                 
 
 
5_CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: BRAZIL, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/br.html (last updated Nov. 17, 2017). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Matthew DiLallo, 3 Top Brazilian Stocks to Buy in 2017, THE MOTLEY FOOL, 
LLC._(June_6,_2017,_2:14_PM), 
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crushed the stock market even further and has led to crippling 
effects, the likes of which shareholders of many large 
Brazilian companies have felt throughout the country.9 With 
all of the recent volatility within Brazil, the threat of 
corporations entering into bankruptcy has become a real fear 
for shareholders and creditors alike.10  
New bankruptcy filings for 2017 were expected to 
surpass the over 227 corporate bankruptcies requested in 
2016.11 In 2016 a record number of companies, ranging from 
oil equipment to manufacturing to construction firms, 
requested court protection from creditors.12 There were about 
1,863 companies requesting protection, which was around a 
forty-five percent increase in requests from the previous 
year.13 For Brazilian companies, the past three years have 
been riddled with uncertainty, lack of funds, and the threat of 
insolvency; which has ultimately lead to a large number of 
bankruptcies and judicial reorganizations. This article 
discusses, with a focus on the discrepancies between Brazilian 
and U.S. laws, the ever-prevalent power struggle between 
shareholders and creditors during the corporate 
                                                 
 
 
https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/06/06/3-top-brazilian-stocks-
to-buy-in-2017.aspx. 
9 Patti Domm, These US Stocks have the most at risk from the emerging Brazil 
crisis (May 18, 2017, 6:31 PM), CNBC: MARKET INSIDER, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/18/these-u-s-stocks-have-the-most-at-
risk-from-the-emerging-brazil-crisis.html. 
10 Aluísio Alves, Bankruptcy filings for big Brazil firms seen hitting another 
record, REUTERS (January 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
brazil-restructuring-bankruptcy/bankruptcy-filings-for-big-brazil-firms-
seen-hitting-another-record-idUSKBN15E2NG. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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reorganization process that begins when companies file for 
judicial bankruptcy protections in Brazil. 
III. GOALS OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY 
Investors are aware that one of the biggest risks of the 
lending market is the possibility of corporate insolvency and 
bankruptcy. Some creditors view bankruptcy as beneficial to 
their cause while others see it as harmful to their initial 
investment. The only way to figure out whom the corporate 
bankruptcy process benefits is to determine the main goals 
behind filing. Certain safeguards are put in place to protect 
both creditors and equity holders in a judicial bankruptcy, but 
what is the central goal of corporations filing for and going 
through the restructuring process?  
Corporations file for bankruptcy when they can no 
longer keep up with their ongoing short-term and long-term 
obligations. They need help in order to carry on their regular 
operations without sinking deeper into debt. The benefit of 
corporate bankruptcy is conferred to both the secured and 
unsecured creditors as well as the company’s equity holders. 
But, who is supposed to benefit the most from corporate 
reorganization: the company itself or its creditors?  
In many instances, what the shareholders want to gain 
from corporate bankruptcy is much different than what the 
creditors desire from the process. The shareholders want to 
retain their equity interests and hold onto shares until the 
company turns things around, even if it comes at the expense 
of creditors.14 The creditors, on the other hand, want to seize 
                                                 
 
 
14 Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 582 
(1998). 
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the company’s assets and sell them off as soon as possible in 
order to repay their debts.15 Both parties have their own 
interests in mind when it comes to the insolvent company. 
The creditors are not concerned if their benefit comes at the 
detriment of the shareholders and vice versa. In theory, 
bankruptcy courts are designed to take a balanced approach 
to corporate reorganization. The court is expected to weigh 
the options and determine what is best for all parties involved 
while allowing a seamless reorganization. 
 The reorganization process provides businesses with 
a second chance to continue on with their endeavors. 
Bankruptcy allows insolvent corporations to have a fresh start 
once the business has paid off all of the agreed upon 
obligations. Traditional experts (“traditionalists”) in the field 
of bankruptcy believe that reorganization is vital to preserve 
not just the companies themselves, but also the jobs 
opportunities that these companies provide to the local 
communities.16 Alternatively, there are procedural experts 
(“proceduralists”) who believe that the preservation of 
companies is not an independent good in itself that comes 
from the bankruptcy.17 Does corporate reorganization serve 
mainly to pay off the creditors and cut losses or to save the 
corporation from going under? 
If corporate reorganization laws serve to protect the 
company, then an environment where laws give the 
shareholders more negotiating power in the process is 
beneficial to the overarching bankruptcy goals. When a 
corporation enters into bankruptcy the shareholders have the 
                                                 
 
 
15 Id. at 581. 
16 Id. at 579. 
17 Id. at 579-80. 
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business’ viability in mind, they would prefer to see 
continued growth instead of liquidation. In order to maintain 
the shareholders’ equity stake and capital investment, the 
company must be successfully reorganized; otherwise 
shareholders stand to lose their entire investments. This 
means that the shareholders will attempt to dispose of certain 
creditors through use of the reorganization plan. Ridding the 
company of these obligations will facilitate an environment 
where the balance sheet ultimately shows assets that are 
larger than liabilities once the fresh start begins. This may 
come at the expense of the creditors, which, if the main goal 
of reorganization is to the save the company and allow it to 
continue on, would be considered an act for the greater good. 
On the other hand, if the main goal is to maximize the 
value of the estate and adequately pay creditors, then giving 
shareholders more power is not necessarily in the best interest 
of the process. In order to increase value for creditors, there 
needs to be at least some dilution of equity and an increase in 
the value of the estate. The general unsecured creditors would 
require more power in the process as well as the ability to 
create a unified creditor’s committee. It is in the best interest 
of the general unsecured creditors to increase the value of the 
corporation’s estate in order to preserve a larger payout and 
receive higher percentages of their claims after the secured 
creditors liens are satisfied.  
The secured creditors believe that selling off the 
company’s assets is more beneficial to them than allowing the 
company to continue on its business operations. When a 
company reorganizes using secured collateral, the collateral 
tends to depreciate and lose most of its value. The secured 
creditors need the opportunity to ask for adequate protection 
and even propose their own plans to the court in order to 
preserve some of the collateral’s value. The interests of 
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shareholders and secured creditors in either process are 
almost directly averse to each other. It is important to figure 
out the primary policy behind the Brazilian bankruptcy laws 
in order to determine whether the shareholders or the 
creditors should have more say in the process. 
The point of reorganization is to allow an insolvent 
company to continue its operations when the going concern 
value is viewed as more favorable than liquidation value. 
Generally, the going concern value is beneficial to most 
parties involved, unless the corporation ultimately fails. In 
liquidation, shareholders lose their equity as the company is 
dissolved and its assets are sold off.18 Usually, a majority of 
the company’s assets are secured by liens, some of which may 
have decreased in value over the life of the loan.19 Once assets 
are sold off, very little value is left for the general unsecured 
creditors to recover.20 In liquidation proceedings, general 
unsecured creditors’ claims are paid pennies on the dollar, if 
they even see a return at all.21 Usually, all or most of a 
company’s collateral is encumbered by multiple liens and the 
remaining value in the estate is minimal. In liquidation sales, 
collateral sells for the foreclosure value, which is much less 
                                                 
 
 
18 Understanding Bankruptcy: The Differences Between Reorganization and 
Liquidation,_MAXWELL_DUNN_PLC_(July_10,_2015),  
http://maxwelldunnlaw.com/blog/understanding-bankruptcy-the-
differences-between-reorganization-and-liquidation/. 
19David C. Smith & Mark Jenkins, Creditor Conflict and the Efficiency of 
Corporate_Reorganization,_7_(2014),_http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdo
c/download?doi=10.1.1.445.3920&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
20 Brook E. Gotberg, Conflicting Preferences in Business Bankruptcy: The Need 
for Different Rules in Different Chapters, 100 IOWA L. REV. 51, 88 (2014). 
21 Harley Hahn, Liquidation or Reorganization? SANTA BARBARA 
INDEPENDENT_(2013),_https://www.independent.com/news/2013/may
/05/liquidation-or-reorganization/. 
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than market value. This leaves almost every creditor’s claim, 
secured and unsecured, unsatisfied. Conversely, companies 
who reorganize have a higher probability of satisfying their 
debts and making creditors more whole than liquidated 
companies.22  
In the United States, the main goal of corporate 
bankruptcy is to maximize the estate.23 The debtor in 
possession is required to maximize the amount of value 
contained within the estate in order to pay back creditors over 
the course of the plan.24 Shareholders of bankrupt companies 
in the United States barely have a voice in the bankruptcy and 
are the last to recover-after all other classes of creditors have 
been paid. The absolute priority rule set out in section 
1129(b)(2) of the code prevents any junior class from receiving 
payment if a senior class has not been paid in full.25 As the 
most junior class in a chapter 11 bankruptcies, shareholders 
are at a huge disadvantage. In U.S. chapter 11 cases the 
creditors have more power because the goal is not to save the 
company, but to pay back the creditors. Corporations in 
chapter 11 are almost completely governed by the bankruptcy 
court, which protects the interests of the creditors and only 
promotes rehabilitation of the debtor corporation only where 
it is deemed feasible.26   
                                                 
 
 
22 See Understanding Bankruptcy, supra note 18. 
23 David K. Spiro, Robert S. Westermann, & Sheila DeLa Cruz, Summary of 
Chapter 11 Procedures and Process, 4, http://www.hf-
law.com/images/uploads/VBA_Summary_of_Chapter_11_Procedures_
and_Process.pdf. 
24 Id.  
25 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2017). 
26 See Spiro, supra note 23, at 5. 
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The main goal of Brazilian bankruptcy after the 2005 
amendments was allegedly to increase the creditor rights in 
an attempt to mirror the United States code for chapter 11.27 
This has not created an environment as creditor-friendly as in 
the United States, because shareholders still have much more 
of a say in Brazilian corporate bankruptcies. The lack of an 
absolute priority rule is one of the main factors that 
differentiate the plan proposal process between both 
countries. Additionally, under the current judicial 
reorganization laws, Brazilian corporations have the ability to 
pay dividends upstream even before repaying their 
restructured debts once they pass through the reorganization 
process.28 Often, money to shareholders is paid out before the 
already restructured secured bank debts are even marginally 
repaid.29 
The Brazilian corporation also enjoys the exclusive 
ability to propose a plan throughout the entirety of the case, 
while in the United States the exclusive period is only the first 
120 days after filing.30 Additionally, there are no strictly 
adhered to avoidance powers in Brazilian corporate 
bankruptcy. This means that there is less capital coming into 
the estate to be paid to general unsecured creditors and 
certain creditors may be treated with a preference over 
                                                 
 
 
27 John J. Rapisardi & Joseph Zujkowski, Navigating Judicial Reorganization 
Under the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, 256 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 2016, at 1. 
28 Fitch Ratings, Fitch: Brazilian Bankruptcy Law Changes May Boost Lending 
Growth_(April_4,_2017,_8:25_AM),_REUTERS, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/fitch-brazilian-bankruptcy-law-
changes-m/fitch-brazilian-bankruptcy-law-changes-may-boost-lending-
growth-idUSFit994113. 
29 Id. 
30 See Rapisardi, supra note 27, at 2. 
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others.31 In the United States, the trustee’s avoidance powers 
allow for preferences and fraudulent transfers within a 
certain period of time before filing to be returned to the estate. 
Courts and trustees in Brazilian judicial reorganizations do 
not apply the measures that are utilized by courts in the 
United States that are meant to maximize the bankruptcy 
estate.  
The difference in priorities between the two countries 
has an immense effect on the way they treat corporate 
reorganizations. Although Brazilian bankruptcy laws have 
attempted to be more creditor-friendly, the shareholders still 
have a much larger say than in the United States. Majority 
shareholders have a lot of influence when it comes to the 
board of directors’ decision on accepting any newly proposed 
plan. The influence that shareholders have in the Brazilian 
bankruptcy process coupled with the multiple rejections of 
the creditors’ newly proposed plans leads to a more drawn 
out process and less favorable terms for the creditors. 
IV. BACKGROUND ON BRAZILIAN BANKRUPTCY LAWS 
On February 9, 2005 Brazil enacted the new Brazilian 
Bankruptcy and Restructuring Law (“BBL”), also known as 
Federal Law No. 11.101.32 This law sought to revitalize the 
corporate bankruptcy process and did away with the 
                                                 
 
 
31 Id. 
32 Restructuring & Insolvency (Nov. 2017), GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, 
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/35/jurisdiction/6/restructuri
ng-insolvency-2017-brazil/. 
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outdated bankruptcy laws that had been in use since 1945.33 
The new BBL was modeled after the United States Chapter 11 
code, moving the country’s corporate bankruptcy laws away 
from liquidation with a push towards restructuring and 
reorganization.34 The new rehabilitation procedures allowed 
for either (a) an in-court judicial reorganization, (b) a pre-
packaged reorganization handled outside the courtroom, or 
(c) liquidation.35 
During the in-court judicial reorganization, the debtor 
is protected against the enforcement of actions throughout a 
certain period of time, similar to the automatic stay in U.S. 
chapter 11.36 The stay period for judicial reorganization in 
Brazil is a statutorily mandated 180 days, which is triggered 
once the court accepts the petition for reorganization.37 
During this stay period, the debtor negotiates and prepares 
its plan for reorganization that the creditors must approve.38 
If the debtor does not file a plan within 60 days of acceptance 
of the case, the bankruptcy is automatically converted to 
liquidation instead of remaining a reorganization.39  
Once the plan is agreed upon and confirmed, pre-
petition claims are discharged and the company can continue 
                                                 
 
 
33 Giuliano Colombo & Thiago Braga Junquiera, Ten Years of the Brazilian 
Bankruptcy Law: Some Lessons Learned and Some Wishes for Improvement, 1 
CLEARY GOTTLIEB EMERGING MKTS. RESTRUCTURING J., (Spring 2016), at 11. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 2017 Insolvency and Corporate Reorganization Report: Brazil (April 25, 
2017), INTL. FIN. L. REV., http://www.iflr.com/Article/3712317/2017-
Insolvency-and-Corporate-Reorganisation-Report-Brazil.html. 
38 See Colombo, supra note 33. 
39John J. Rapisardi & Joseph Zujkowski, Bankruptcy Basics Under Brazilian 
Law, 252 N.Y.L.J., (July 3, 2014), at 2. 
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on with its operations.40 The only way for a company to enter 
into judicial reorganization is by its own volition, creditors 
cannot force judicial bankruptcy upon a corporate 
institution.41 Additionally, once a debtor files for judicial 
reorganization it maintains plan exclusivity throughout the 
entirety of the case.42 As a result, the only leverage that 
creditors have in plan negotiation is threatening to vote 
against the plan or objecting to its approval.43 This gives the 
debtor company, along with the controlling shareholders 
within that company, much more leverage than the creditors 
during the judicial bankruptcy process. 
Once in judicial reorganization, the court appoints a 
trustee to work with the debtor’s directors and officer or 
whoever remains in charge of the business.44 All of the 
debtor’s operating activities, the meeting with creditors, the 
books and records, and performance of administrative duties 
are supervised by the appointed trustee.45 As long as the 
debtor meets all of its deadlines and the plan is accepted, the 
company can move forward with the repayment of debts and 
a fresh start. This is a huge change from the overturned 1945 
Brazilian bankruptcy laws, where most companies were 
liquidated instead of given the chance to preserve their going 
concern value and reorganize.  
                                                 
 
 
40 See Colombo, supra note 33.  
41 Paulo Fernando Campana Filho, The Legal Framework For Cross-Border 
Insolvency in Brazil, 32 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 97, 115 (2010). 
42See Rapsardi, supra note 39 at 2.  
43 Id. 
44Jeffrey M. Anapolsky & Jessica F. Woods, Pitfalls in Brazilian Bankruptcy 
Law for International Bond Investors, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 397, 403 (2013). 
45 Id. 
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The extrajudicial reorganization is intended to be an 
expedited process where the debtor obtains a quick 
confirmation of the prepackaged proposed plan.46 The court 
does oversee parts of this process, but the courts do not have 
to intervene much because the plan has already been 
negotiated and accepted by the majority shareholders and 
creditors.47 Both the judicial and extrajudicial restructuring 
options are used when the debtor company still has a certain 
amount of going concern value and can feasibly continue on 
its business operations after reorganization. If the business is 
deemed non-viable, then bankruptcy liquidation of the debtor 
will occur.48  
In order for the judicial reorganization process to move 
forward, a certain number of creditors must approve the plan. 
The creditor class system used in judicial reorganizations 
differs slightly from those in the United States.49Just like in the 
United States, if a creditor class does not accept the terms of 
the plan there is an option for cram down.50 In order the 
successfully cram down the plan, each of the creditor classes 
must be satisfied through the following: (a) creditors holding 
more than fifty percent of the credit value must approve, 
regardless of their creditor class; (b) at least two creditor 
                                                 
 
 
46 See Colombo, supra note 33. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 12. 
49Angela Paes De B. Di Franco & Renato Din Oikawa, 2016 Insolvency and 
Corporate Reorganization Report: Brazil (May 9, 2016), MONDAQ, 
http://www.mondaq.com/brazil/x/489486/Insolvency+Bankruptcy/2
016+Insolvency+And+Corporate+Reorganisation+Report+Brazil. 
(Stating the different class structures and priorities in Brazilian corporate 
reorganizations.)  
50 See 2017 Insolvency and Corporate Reorganization Report, supra note 37. 
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classes must approve the plan by more than fifty percent in 
both number and value; (c) the class of creditors to be 
crammed down must approve by at least one third in both 
number and value; and (d) there is a prohibition of unfair 
discrimination in the class that rejects the plan.51 After those 
requirements are fulfilled, the plan can be crammed down on 
the rejecting class and the case can move forward. Because 
there is no absolute priority rule in Brazil, cram down is much 
easier. A lack of absolute priority rule to regulate “fairness” 
means that there is no requirement for higher classes to be 
fully satisfied before any lower classes are paid out. In theory, 
even if the abovementioned class numbers approve the plan, 
the shareholders could legally receive payment before any 
secured or unsecured creditors. 
The United States provides for the requirement that a 
plan be “fair and equitable” in section 1129 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which triggers the absolute priority rule. In Brazil, there 
is no such statutory provision, which means creditor rejection 
of the plan does not invoke an absolute priority rule.52 
Without an absolute priority rule, Brazil has no stipulations 
about the order of payments in bankruptcy. In the United 
States the absolute priority rule provides that no “holder of 
any claim or interest that is junior to the claim or interest of 
such [unpaid] class will not receive or retain under the plan 
on account of such junior interest in property.”53  
In order for a debtor in possession in the United States 
to cram down a plan, it has to virtually exhaust the estate in 
order to pay the senior classes. The leftover value in the estate, 
                                                 
 
 
51See Di Franco, supra note 49. 
52 Id. 
53 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2017). 
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if there is any at all, leaves little to nothing for shareholders. 
Because Brazils lacks this absolute priority rule, the creditors 
have no say in the order of class payment. Even though 
creditors take the time to secure and perfect liens on property 
in order to have priority, secured creditors in Brazil are not 
required to be paid to the same extent that they would in the 
United States. Unsecured creditors and even shareholders 
have the ability to receive their claims before the secured 
creditor class is fully satisfied, or even satisfied at all.  
 Transparency is a fundamental part of the institution 
of Brazil’s new bankruptcy laws. The debtor company’s 
honesty throughout the process allows for the creation of 
value and a mutual understanding of each party’s underlying 
intentions.54 When an insolvent company communicates 
clearly about its liabilities, assets, operations, and goals, 
judicial reorganization becomes a much quicker process. 
Before the enactment of the BBL, there were huge inequities 
between creditor classes, where most secured and unsecured 
debt took a back seat to tax liabilities and the payment of 
employees.55 In theory, the BBL assists unsecured creditors 
and equity holders in retaining more value than the previous 
law allowed. Because labor and employment claims have a 
maximum payout threshold, the secured creditors and 
unsecured creditors receive a higher percentage of their 
claims. As a result, the shareholders retain a maximized 
amount of equity in the firm. 
 
                                                 
 
 
54Luis Fernando Valente de Paiva, Understanding the Intricacies of Brazilian 
Bankruptcy Law, 2011 WL 586859 1, 6.  
55 Id. at 2. 
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V. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL 
Although the BBL was modeled after the United States 
Bankruptcy code, there are many differences between the two 
laws. When Brazil enacted their new laws in 2005, the United 
States also modified their bankruptcy code that same year. 
Differences between the codes have led to very different 
outcomes for both creditors and shareholders, as well as in 
the length of time the process takes. 
The first difference arises from the voluntariness of 
filing for bankruptcy. Under the new BBL, a debtor 
corporation has the exclusive right to file for judicial 
reorganization.56 Adversely, in the United States, chapter 11 
bankruptcy cases can be involuntarily commenced through a 
filing of the debtor’s creditors.57 This means that in Brazil, 
creditors are left without the ability to file a reorganization 
remedy and only have the ability to file for a liquidation of 
the debtor company.58 Liquidations are less useful in the case 
of corporate bankruptcy, as the going concern value of 
keeping the company alive is larger than the pennies on the 
dollar received through a liquidation process. 
The second difference between the codes concerns plan 
exclusivity. In the United States, the debtor has the exclusive 
privilege of filing a chapter 11 plan within 120 days after the 
commencement of the case.59 This time of exclusivity can be 
extended, but only up to 18 months after the commencement 
of the case.60 In a Brazilian judicial reorganization, the debtor 
                                                 
 
 
56 See 2017 Insolvency Report, supra note 37. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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enjoys the exclusive right to file a plan throughout the entirety 
of the case.61 The creditors of the Brazilian company may 
propose alternative plans of their own, but these plans cannot 
be filed without the consent of the debtor. This exclusivity 
comes with the caveat that the debtor only enjoys an 
automatic stay period of 180 days and that the debtor’s plan 
must be proposed within an extremely short 60-day period 
after commencement of the case.62 If a plan is not proposed 
within the first 60 days, then the company’s bankruptcy is 
automatically converted to a liquidation proceeding.63 
Conversion to a liquidation proceeding will also occur if the 
Brazilian corporation’s plan is rejected by more than fifty 
percent of the creditors (by face value) present at any 
creditor’s meeting.64 
Within any United States corporate bankruptcy 
preceding the role of the creditor’s committee is very 
important. Brazil’s new BBL statutory scheme provides for 
the formation of a creditor’s committee, but these creditor’s 
committees are rarely formed.65 Creditor’s committees in the 
United States generally only include representatives from the 
unsecured creditors parties.66 Conversely, in Brazil the 
creditor’s committee is made up of one labor creditor 
representative, one secured creditor representative, and one 
general unsecured creditor representative.67 The interests of 
these three groups almost always differ, which makes it 
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difficult for them to work together in order to adequately 
represent a common goal for the singular creditor’s 
committee. Additionally, in the United Stated the expenses of 
the creditor’s committee are paid by the debtor’s estate, but in 
Brazil most creditor committee expenses are not 
reimbursed.68 The Brazilian creditor’s committee also face 
harsher rules and punishments regarding losses to the estate 
caused by negligence or malice.69 For these reasons, ad hoc 
groups are formed more commonly than creditor’s 
committees in Brazilian corporate bankruptcies. 
Voting rights are also different in Brazilian corporate 
bankruptcies than they are in United States chapter 11 cases. 
In the United States, individual bondholders have the right to 
vote on the debtor’s proposed plan.70 In Brazil, unless 
bondholders commence a claim for separation, an indentured 
trustee is chosen to vote on the plan on behalf of all the 
bondholders.71 In order to avoid this, a bondholder can 
separate his claim through an elaborate and complex process. 
The bondholder must file a proof of claim with the judicial 
trustee within 15 days of the case being noticed to the public.72 
Proofs of claim ownership cannot be submitted via digital 
copy in Brazil, making it difficult for bondholders to obtain 
originals in order the separate their claims. 
Overall, even though the BBL was based off of the 
United States chapter 11 code, the differences between them 
make for large distinctions in the treatment of creditors. In 
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Brazil, the lack of cohesive creditor committees makes it 
difficult for all creditors to be satisfied by any one proposed 
plan. The debtor’s large exclusivity period makes it almost 
impossible for the creditors to vote on a plan that they believe 
will be beneficial to their interests. The limit of three voting 
classes lumps bondholder and creditors into less specific 
unsecured creditor classes to their detriment. Secured 
creditors have a tougher time gaining benefits from Brazilian 
corporate bankruptcies without a rule regulating fairness, like 
he absolute priority rule. In the United States, creditors are 
treated more equitably with stricter rules on fairness to 
creditor classes. The Brazilian code tried to replicate the 
creditor friendliness found in the United States code, but still 
has work to do if the goal is to make the process as creditor 
friendly as it is in the United States.   
VI. A CASE STUDY OF OI SA 
One of the most notable cases of Brazilian corporate 
bankruptcy in 2016 was the filing of Oi SA (“Oi”), formerly 
known as Telemar.73 Oi is the largest telecommunications 
company in Brazil, with over 74.5 million customers.74 When 
the company filed in June of 2016, it was Brazil’s largest ever 
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corporate bankruptcy.75As a result of Brazil’s recession and 
the ongoing political scandals, Oi ran out of time to 
reorganize operations and restructure over $19.3 billion 
dollars of debt, leading to Oi’s filing for protection with the 
bankruptcy court.76 At the time of filing, Oi’s debt consisted 
of funds that were only 25% from Brazilian currency and 75% 
from currencies other than the Brazilian real.77 The creditors 
whose capital was most at stake were the foreign investors. 
Since filing for judicial reorganization, Oi hosted 
several conversations with creditors about potential plan 
proposals. Discussions with creditors and bondholders about 
restructuring the debt ceased shortly after the shareholders 
realized that an agreement with creditors would result in a 
dramatic cut of their stake in the company.78 During 
settlement talks, former Oi CEO Bayard Gontijo favored a 
proposal that would give creditors a 95% stake in the 
company and leave current shareholders with virtually 
nothing.79 The struggle between the shareholders of large 
corporations and their major creditors is a significant issue in 
current Brazilian corporate bankruptcy cases. Who really has 
the power when it comes to decision-making during the 
restructuring process?  
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From June of 2016 until December 2017 Oi held several 
discussions with its creditors and shareholders about their 
reorganization process. The creditors several ad hoc 
committees submitted a multitude of new plans, but the 
company’s board rejected each creditor proposal for over a 
year and a half.80 The Oi board of directors, in return, 
submitted several of their own proposals, none of which the 
creditors found to be suitable.81 Because Oi had plan 
exclusivity throughout the entire proposal process, it was 
difficult for creditors to negotiate with equity holders. 
Both parties rejected each other’s plans because the 
shareholders and creditors could not agree on a middle 
ground. The shareholders wanted to keep as much of their 
equity as possible so that their payout would not be severely 
impaired or diluted. On November 3, 2017, Oi mistakenly 
disseminated a notice to the market that the company 
accepted the creditor’s newest plan, leading to a false hope of 
a resolution after over a year of negotiations.82 A press release 
later that week on November 6, 2017 confirmed that the 
referenced plan was not accepted and that the board members 
of Oi were still conflicted as to what would be best for the 
shareholders.83 The press release accused the Oi board 
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members of shirking their fiduciary duties and appointing 
new board members instead of carefully considering the 
plans they were given.84The press release also accuses the 
“Shareholder Plan” as “being backed by the minority 
shareholders [who were] exerting control in an attempt to 
preserve their equity position, and attempt[ed] to do so by 
enlisting what the Oi Creditor Groups understood to be only 
a handful of insignificant [equity] holders...who [would be] 
seeking exorbitant fees at the time the transaction [would] 
inevitably fail.”85 This somewhat proved that the 
shareholders were the ones with the power in this situation, 
pulling strings from behind the scenes in order to maintain 
their stake in Oi. As a result of this blatant shareholder 
infiltration of Oi’s board of directors, the court effectively 
removed the board from ongoing debt renegotiations.86 The 
board continued attempts at retaining power throughout the 
process, because without their say an unfavorable plan could 
have been voted on an approved. 
Those who really had the most to power in the 
company’s voting process were the majority shareholders 
and equity holders of Oi. The largest shareholder of Oi at the 
time was Bratel S.A. R.L, which owned 22.24% of the 
825,760,802 shares on the market.87 The second largest was 
Societe Mondiale Fundo de Envestemento em Acoes, holding 
                                                 
 
 
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Gram Slattery, Key Oi shareholder asks judge to declare Aurelius “abusive”, 
REUTERS_(Dec._5,_2017),_https://www.reuters.com/article/oi-sa-
restructuring/key-oi-shareholder-asks-judge-to-declare-aurelius-
abusive-idUSL1N1O521Z. 
87_Oi_S.A.,_Ownership_Breakdown,_(Dec._18,_2017), 
http://ri.oi.com.br/conteudo_en.asp?idioma=1&conta=44&tipo=43641. 
362 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 25 
 
about 5.28% of the total shares.88 The third and fourth largest 
shareholder were Goldman Sachs International and Bndes 
Participacoes S.A. Bndespar, respectively, both holding just 
under 5% of total shares.89 The other two majority 
shareholders, Marathon Asset Management L.P. and Mare 
Finance Investment Holdings designated Activi, both held 
between 1.5% and 2% of the total number of shares.90 The 
minority shareholders made up the remaining 41.45% of the 
equity in the company.91 Oi’s shares were selling at about 4.69 
reals per share in 2017, which equates to $1.45 per share in 
U.S. currency.92 When doing the calculations, the largest 
shareholder owned about $266,291,343 U.S. dollars’ worth of 
shares in Oi. There was a lot of money at stake for these 
majority shareholders. They realized that their shares would 
most likely become diluted, but by how much? 
 Oi claimed that the proposed creditor plans treated its 
stakeholders unfairly and the company’s own proposals 
included a debt to for equity swap of 25%.93 The creditor’s 
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plans also “provided for the discharge of third party claims 
against the Company and its subsidiaries on customary 
terms, provided that such discharge shall not waive or release 
of any claims against shareholders, officers and directors of 
the Company.”94 Although Oi rejected the plan, the creditors 
still believed that it was in their best interest to continue with 
negotiations instead of moving forward with a liquidation of 
the company.95  
Regardless of the removal of Oi’s board of directors 
from the voting process, it was still difficult to approve a 
creditor-friendly plan. Even though the board and its 
shareholder influencers were removed from power, they did 
joined together in an attempt to partner with public sector 
creditors in order to pass Oi’s restructuring plan in the face of 
the opposition by the bondholders.96 With a push from certain 
shareholders, the board was offering deals to state banks in 
exchange for votes.97 The deals included a repayment of the 
banks claims at full nominal value, but over a longer period 
of time.98 Oi’s deal contained provisions that allowed for the 
company to have a six-year grace period before requiring it to 
make payments to the banks, and then a ten-year period in 
which to pay off the value of the loans.99 Oi’s board offered 
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similar deals to investment banking units and international 
credit agencies.100  
The board required not only the support of the public 
sector creditors, but approval by 20-25% of the bondholders 
in order to pass Oi’s final plan.101 The major bondholders also 
wanted to avoid liquidation at all costs because they had more 
to gain from Oi’s reorganization than from the company’s 
liquidation.102 Oi viewed some of their major bondholders as 
hostile entities, and moved to remove the bondholder’s vote 
during the process.103 Without a rule for fairness, the Oi plan 
negotiations lasted over a year and a half. This is valuable 
time that could have been spent repaying debts instead of 
racking up more bills during the negotiations. 
The real question here is: when will a plan be 
satisfactory to all parties in a Brazilian bankruptcy? In a 
bankruptcy proceeding this large, there is no way for all sides 
to be completely happy, but they do need to come to an 
agreement. In the end, the courts practically had to force a 
plan onto the board in December 2017. After a 15 hour 
meeting, three of the four creditor classes voted to approve a 
plan on December 19, 2017.104 Because Brazil doesn’t have an 
absolute priority rule, the plan was accepted even though one 
of the largest creditors voted against it. As for creditors from 
the United States, the bankruptcy court offered little to no 
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relief. United States bankruptcy judges stated that the fight 
over Oi’s future “must be fought in the Brazilian courts, not 
in the U.S. courts.”105 In cases like these, the lack of absolute 
priority rule was a large reason why the plan proposal period 
took so long, but it was also the reason why a plan was 
ultimately put into place. The parties had a longer amount of 
time to negotiate and find a mutually-beneficial breakdown 
of debt repayments.  
VII. THE FUTURE OF BRAZILIAN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY 
Where is Brazilian corporate bankruptcy headed in the 
future? Brazilian officials are discussing further amending the 
2005 bankruptcy code.106 With the biggest recession in the 
country’s history leading to a surplus of insolvent companies, 
the proposed reforms are attempting to alleviate some of the 
economic pressure on corporations and lift Brazil out of the 
recession. Under the current code, it takes several years for an 
insolvent corporation to approve a plan and then some 
additional years to actually complete the plan.107 The process 
is excruciatingly long and the Brazilian government wants to 
make the time frame more compact.108 The changes would 
allow indebted corporations to emerge from bankruptcy 
more quickly and begin their fresh start even earlier.109 The 
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average length of a judicial reorganization for Brazilian 
corporations is around eight years and the proposed changes 
would quarter the time it takes to get through the process.110 
In addition to limiting the bankruptcy protection to only two 
years, the proposed amendments would make it easier for the 
debtor corporation to borrow funds and maintain 
operations.111 The proposed changes also purport to help 
creditors by granting them stronger powers in the plan 
negotiations.112  
According to Fitch Ratings, a change recently 
proposed by the Temer administration has the ability to 
improve the ability to obtain credit.113 The proposed changes 
will provide additional comfort to banks, which will 
ultimately support future lending growth.114 Brazilian banks 
currently have around ten million real in repossessed assets 
as collateral from unpaid loans.115 It is unclear if the proposed 
new laws will allow banks to continue their practice of 
repossession. Right now, the code gives banks the right of 
fiduciary alienation.116 Fiduciary alienation allows the banks 
to repossess collateralized property, even if the defaulting 
corporation has filed for judicial reorganization.117 If banks 
lose their right to fiduciary alienation and their right to collect 
collateral, these loans will come at a higher cost to 
corporations. Although the 2005 amendments were created to 
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make the judicial reorganization process more creditor-
friendly, the pending bankruptcy legislation puts more 
emphasis on debtor’s rights. 
Out of the 6,586 Brazilian corporations that applied for 
judicial reorganization since 2005, only five percent have 
recovered from the process.118 Brazil is in need of 
amendments to their bankruptcy code in order the better help 
the insolvent corporations that file for bankruptcy 
protections. As of now, the very small percentage of 
corporations that actually recover from judicial 
reorganization in Brazil is a red flag that their system is not 
working. In addition to the abovementioned reforms, the 
Brazilian government has also been discussing changing the 
way taxes are treated during judicial reorganization.119  
Right now, there are no specified bankruptcy courts 
that deal with corporate filings; all bankruptcies are handled 
by the main court system in whatever district the company 
headquarters is located. Discussions about creating 
specialized courts would make a significant difference in how 
bankruptcy cases are handled.120 Judges with superior 
knowledge of the inner workings and technicalities behind 
bankruptcies would expedite the process and create fairer 
results for all parties involved. Fitch, a United States based 
credit rating service, believes that these changes will have a 
positive impact on the judicial reorganization process as a 
whole.121 If the changes are announced and implemented 
quickly, they may save hundreds, if not thousands of 
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corporations and creditors from falling into the prolonged 
and treacherous judicial reorganization system. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Even though the Brazilian government tried to adopt a 
bankruptcy code similar to the United States chapter 11, it has 
not made the process as creditor-friendly as in the U.S. 
Brazil’s attempt at increased creditor rights turned the judicial 
restructuring processes into one that is still majorly controlled 
by shareholders rather than creditors. The Brazilian 
government did adopt the measures used in United States 
courts to maximize the estate and overall disbursements to 
creditors, but the amendments need further modification if 
the goal really is to increase creditor’s rights. The limited 
exclusivity period, the absolute priority rule, the trustee’s 
avoidance powers, the creditor’s committee for unsecured 
creditors, the first priority of secured creditors, adequate 
protection, and specialized bankruptcy courts are all tools 
used by the United Stated to maximize the estate. Brazil, on 
the other hand, does not use those but still expects to keep 
creditor’s interests in mind. Ultimately, Brazil needs to 
further amend their bankruptcy code and add more 
safeguards to protect creditor’s rights and facilitate the 
continuation of the corporation.  
One option is to add a rule that regulates fairness, 
similar to U.S. chapter 11’s absolute priority rule. In cases 
where an entire company along with its creditors and 
shareholders are at stakes, there should be some regulation of 
debt payout. As shown through cases in the United States, 
with the addition of an absolute priority rule comes a shorter 
plan proposal period. This means that the debtor company 
loses less money during the negotiation phase, which it can 
then use to reorganize more efficiently and effectively. Brazil 
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needs to define their main goals of corporate bankruptcy so 
that better safeguards can be put in place to uphold those 
goals. “Fairness” is very subjective, but as seen in the Oi case, 
a lack of regulations regarding fair and equitable plan 
proposals leads to longer negotiations, disgruntled parties, 
and time spent on lofty goals instead of reaching more 
grounded offers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
